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Abstract 
There is a contemporary dialectic concerning the status of evidence-based medicine, criticising it for being ‘scientistic’, 
epistemologically inconsistent, rigid and dismissive of non-numerical sources of knowledge. A host of alternative 
frameworks has been proposed, including values-based medicine, narrative medicine, patient-centered care and person-
centered medicine. Person-centered medicine is amongst the most persuasive and well-argued models. Miles and Mezzich 
[1] have argued in a major article that person-centered medicine employs theories of personhood to elaborate and justify its 
epistemology and praxis. At the same time, they claim that person-centered medicine is an ‘emergent’ concept that needs no 
base or foundation to justify it. We believe, however, that without some foundational values to underpin the status claimed 
for personhood, the arguments for person-centered medicine are incomplete. We therefore propose a set of foundational 
values – survival, security and flourishing – that underpin individual and social functioning transculturally. While these 
values are the same in all cultures, their expressions differ from culture to culture. Importantly, our notion of values is only 
modestly foundational. Modest foundationalism recognises that foundational propositions are only ‘warrantable assertions’ 
that may very well change in time and place. Foundational values in this sense are pragmatic and heuristic in kind and not 
normative. We enter a plea for their recognition in the form of the values-based medicine we describe. 
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Justification in Medicine 
 
The problem with evidence “based” 
medicine 
 
There is a strand of criticism applied to evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) that has grown stronger and more 
compelling in the 21st century. EBM has been criticised for 
being “scientistic”, morally narrow, dehumanising and 
productive of ‘cookbook’ and ‘defensive’ medicine [2-11]. 
Despite the vigour and intensity of the critiques of 
evidence-based medicine (EBM) on epistemological and 
ethical grounds, it retains much contemporary support and 
generates considerable heat when taken literally and used 
to dismiss technologies or treatments whose effectiveness, 
cost-benefits and relative risks remain unproven. The 
recent dispute about the use of recombinant activated 
Factor VII (rFVIIa) is typical of the problem, which is the 
challenge of providing the most up-to-date and effective 
treatment when all the evidence for and against the 
treatment has not yet been fully accounted for. 
rFVIIa is a clotting factor indicated for the treatment 
of haemorrhage in patients with rare haematological 
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disorders, but is also used for major haemorrhage in people 
who do not have these disorders (e.g. in surgery and post-
partum haemorrhage) [12-16]. While this off-label use 
seems logical, is supported by some systematic evidence 
[15,17] and has been observed by clinicians to “work” by 
slowing bleeding, recent systematic reviews have 
suggested that such uses of rFVIIa have no effect on 
overall mortality [18-20] and might be harmful [18]. A 
vigorous debate has since emerged, with opponents of 
these extended uses of rFVIIa raising the possibility of 
legal action against “physicians who persist in such use in 
the face of clear evidence of inutility and harm (and who) 
could be subject to civil action by the affected patients or 
their heirs” [21] and those in favour of extended 
prescribing countering that clinical demands and 
impressions would (and should) trump the evidence 
offered and that clinicians would (and should) continue to 
use rFVIIa for off-label indications [22, 23].  
The drift in this discourse from epistemological issues 
to ethical concerns and then to hints of legal sanction raises 
questions about the validity of EBM as an adequate ‘base’ 
for medicine [24-28]. To base a discipline, its knowledge 
and its praxis, on an abstract category is to claim that the 
base is un-inferred and provides the justification for the 
epistemology and practice of the discipline. It is to make a 
‘foundational’ claim for the base, a claim that the 
discipline can be built from the base by repeated inference 
and deduction, supported by empirical confirmation when 
appropriate. There is certainly a case to be made for 
medical practice to be justified, whenever possible, by 
evidence. There should surely be a supporting reason to 
defend any particular medical intervention - some 
demonstrable effect, or outcome that can be agreed upon 
and approved by practitioners and patients alike. But 
judging the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of these outcomes 
requires a standpoint outside the evidence. It requires the 
application of implicit or explicit standards against which 
to judge the outcome. The very nature of evidence places it 
within that evaluative framework. 
 
Alternatives to evidence-based medicine 
 
Values-based medicine (VBM) [29-32], narrative medicine 
[33,34], patient-centered medicine [35-37], humanistic 
medicine [38-41], person-centered medicine [1,24-
28,30,42] and a host of other competitors have been 
proposed as alternatives to redress the ‘scientistic’ bias that 
EBM seems to have produced in medical thinking. We 
propose, in this essay, to deal largely with VBM and 
person-centered medicine. 
Person-centered medicine is the latest and perhaps the 
most intellectually satisfying, alternative. Its lineage can be 
traced through Hippocrates to the School of Salerno and to 
William Osler, as well as through Peabody and Tournier. 
Miles and Mezzich have persuasively outlined the 
framework and justifications for encouraging person-
centered medicine [1]. They ground their arguments in 
theories of personhood and they show how these theories 
can extend to a person-centered public health in addition to 
the dyadic interactions of conventional medical practice. It 
is very difficult to object to their ideals of achieving a 
medical practice that would provide affordable biomedical 
and technologically advanced care within a humanistic 
framework and that exhibits respect for the patient as 
individual within the context of each person’s capabilities, 
attributes and acquisitions.  
Importantly, however, they deny that person-centered 
medicine provides a foundational base for medical 
practice. Indeed, following Upshur [43], they deny that 
medicine needs a base at all and they present a case for 
person-centered medicine as ‘a dynamic emergent 
framework’, rather than something in need of ‘a single, 
solid foundation’ [1]. While we agree to some extent with 
this claim, we believe that person-centered medicine too 
must appeal to foundations – in this case, to theories of 
personhood that are not without problems [44].  
The nexus between personhood and moral status has 
been acknowledged for centuries [45,46], but logical 
priority of one over the other remains contested [44]. Miles 
and Mezzich have chosen Eric Cassel’s definition of ‘a 
person as an “embodied, purposeful, thinking, feeling, 
emotional, reflective, relational, human individual always 
in action, responsive to meaning and whose life in all 
spheres points both outward and inward”…’ [1]. We may 
be able to define and understand these adjectives and 
gerunds within Western Anglophone communities. But 
what does ‘relational’ mean to a Bosnian Muslim or 
‘emotional, reflective’ to a refugee from Sierra Leone if we 
are to join patient-centered medicine with ‘international’ 
medicine, as Miles and Mezzich do [1]? Definitions and 
understandings of personhood differ widely from place to 
place and from time to time. Person-centered medicine still 
has to answer why we should bother to respect persons. 
[47-51] 
We propose a form of values-based medicine (VBM) 
that is modestly foundational and that may strengthen the 
claims of person-centered medicine (and any other 
alternatives to EBM). VBM has been construed as an 
economic, cost-benefit approach to medical practice [52], 
or as a qualitative concept reflecting on the one hand a 
sensitive attention to patient preferences [29,30,32] and on 
the other a justification for healthcare based on 
foundational human needs [31]. In the remainder of this 
essay we argue for the latter version of VBM and we argue 
that, unlike evidence-based medicine, this provides an 
adequate foundation for medical practice. To do so, we 
need to confront the threats and promises of 
foundationalism, the range of philosophical positions that 
accept that spheres of knowledge can be based on un-
inferred propositions, particularly those generated by 
experience. In particular, we need to distinguish between 
radical and modest foundationalism. 
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Foundationalism 
 
Foundationalism of a naïve or radical kind in ethics is hard 
to defend. We take this kind of foundationalism to mean 
‘deriving a true normative system out of one or several 
first norms’ [53]. The bioethics that Gert, Culver and 
Clouser elaborated in 1997 is of this kind. It defines 10 
‘moral rules’ as its first norms, including such apparently 
uncontroversial items as ‘Do not kill’, ‘Do not cause pain’, 
‘Do not disable’ and ‘Do not deprive of freedom’ [54]. Yet 
each of these ‘rules’ may have to be modified by 
circumstances and by beliefs – abortion can be justified 
under certain circumstances, euthanasia can be practised in 
some parts of the world, surgery frequently causes 
disability and is usually painful and a mental health 
restraint act (community order) can be invoked to deprive 
some people of their freedom. The problem becomes one 
of validating the first norms universally, leading either to 
an endless regress or to circularity. This problem has led 
some writers to champion ‘anti-foundationalism’ on the 
grounds that it frees thinkers and agents from the need to 
stick to a Cartesian chain of reasoning from one truth to 
another, in order to address propositions that may be 
contestable [43,53]. On the other hand, without some sort 
of foundation it is difficult to build any sort of system 
[1,43], nor is it easy to provide justifications for spheres of 
thought and practice. Modest foundationalism, by contrast, 
takes ‘the foundations to be only prima facie adequately 
grounded by experience, adequately grounded provided 
that prima facie status is not overridden by things the 
subject knows or has adequately grounded beliefs about’ 
[55]. As with empirical science, it takes all knowledge to 
be provisional. As Alston points out: 
 
Any reasonable epistemology will have to allow some 
forms of inference that go from adequately grounded 
beliefs to other adequately grounded beliefs and 
therefore will have to find some acceptable way of 
deciding which to allow [55].  
 
Alston also suggests that there is no real epistemological 
alternative to ‘accepting what we feel confident of at the 
moment, subject to revision should it be called for’ [55]. In 
this form, foundational beliefs have a pragmatic function. 
They are heuristics by which we can proceed to reason and 
to judge, provided we also accept that they may be subject 
to revision in the light of new experiences, perceptions and 
discoveries. 
If there are psychological and logical reasons to find 
foundations, points of inquiry beyond which we cannot 
fruitfully go, what might these non-inferential propositions 
look like? We contend that these must be propositions 
about values and that there are some values that, at a very 
deep level, most people and cultures share. In order to 
define these foundations, we can proceed, as Alston 
suggests [55], by iteratively examining the likely 
explanations for the social systems that distinguish all 
cultures, including our own. Why do all cultures have 
health systems of some kind? Perhaps to save life, to 
preserve or restore function in the face of trauma or 
disease, to provide access to skills for those with health 
needs. But why do these things matter? Perhaps because 
people want to go on living without suffering, want to 
realise or extend their capabilities, want help when illness 
threatens or reduces their quality or quantity of life. In 
short, humans value survival, security and the capacity to 
flourish. These values seem to be primal. There seems to 
be nowhere to go beyond them. They take us to the point 
where there is apparently nothing more to say than that all 
the communities we know or can imagine are like that. 
Ernst Junger, for example, imagined a masterly society that 
would emerge if its members could be inured to pain – a 
society that ended in the disintegration of the Wehrmacht 
and chaos for Germany [56]. Without some implicit 
allegiances to foundational concepts as facts – not norms – 
mankind would probably have perished. These allegiances 
exist in individuals and because humans are essentially 
social they are expressed by the social will in such entities 
as health and medical services. We each try to ensure 
survival, to find security and flourishing within societies 
that both enhance and limit their expression. But what do 
we mean by each of these terms? They are imperfect 
semantic labels for extremely complex concepts and the 
best we can do is to point in the direction of their 
meanings. 
Survival is not too hard to define and understand. In 
this context it means the continuation of a life, the 
preservation of life which seems to be instinctively sought. 
Drowning people struggle to survive. Security is best 
understood by examining situations of insecurity. Jean 
Améry, reflecting on his experiences of Auschwitz and 
exile, writes “One feels secure … where no chance 
occurrence is to be expected, nothing completely strange to 
be feared” [57]. We need to know that, in our community, 
everyone will drive on a particular side of the road and will 
stop at red lights; that passers-by will respect our space and 
not assault us; that some kind of health system will be 
available in our time of illness. Security derives from order 
and predictability.  
Flourishing is more complex, because there are so 
many ways for individuals to flourish. Broadly, it refers to 
the increase and expression of capabilities [58] and the 
opportunities that individuals within a culture or a society 
have to transcend their quotidian lives, whether this may 
involve sport, art, literature, film, friendship, religion or 
any of the other countless commitments and relaxations 
that can enrich individual experience and development. 
Each of these foundational values has its opposite – death 
or the threat of early death, insecurity and threat of danger 
and loss of the autonomous and agentic capacity to 
flourish. Practically everyone lives somewhere on the 
continuum between the ends of each scale and everyone 
moves their position on the scale from context to context. 
We thus propose the following: 
 
Little, Lipworth, Gordon and Markham  
 
 
Another argument for values-based medicine 
 
 
 
652 The International Journal of Person Centered Medicine  
Volume 1 Issue 4 pp 649-656 
 
 
[I] all human beings desire their own (and perhaps 
others’) survival, security and flourishing and 
[II] all cultures are expressions of the dominant 
members’ beliefs about the route to survival, security 
and flourishing.  
 
In an ideal society, as we would envisage it, all 
members support the concept of individual autonomy and 
agency with respect to survival, security and flourishing.  
Importantly, unlike the rules proposed by Gert, Culver 
and Clouser, our notion of values is descriptive [I] and 
explanatory [II], rather than normative or justificatory. It 
tells us why things are as they are and not whether they are 
good or bad.  In making these claims we have thus 
extended our inquiry beyond the bounds of the naturalistic 
argument, the is-ought distinction, into the domain of 
axiology [59-61]. As Flanagan and colleagues write: 
 
With regard to the alleged is-ought problem, the 
smart naturalist makes no claims to establish 
demonstratively moral norms. He points to certain 
practices, values, virtues and principles as 
reasonably based on inductive and abductive 
reasoning [62]. 
 
The question then becomes: Do we have to be extreme 
moral relativists if we view cultures and systems in this 
way? Does our capacity to understand all cultures and 
systems as expressions of survival, security and flourishing 
mean that we have to condone whatever we find? The 
answer to this question is a definite “no”. To say that we 
can understand (and perhaps even sympathise with) a 
particular cultural expression of the need for survival, 
security and flourishing is not to say that any expression of 
these foundational values is as good as any other. In any 
culture, those with power might very well be expressing 
their own foundational values at the expense of those with 
less power.  
Argument about the rights and wrongs of cultural 
practices is inevitable. All cultures, sub-cultures and 
discourse communities bring beliefs that have a pragmatic 
truth about them, a ‘warranted assertibility’ [63,64]. Even 
though each group expresses some notion of group or 
individual attachment to survival, security and flourishing, 
some groups will inevitably disagree with others on the 
particular expressions they endorse for each foundational 
value. Tradition, cultural habits, myths, religious 
convictions, experiences, environments, contexts, 
individual differences and so on make sure that modes of 
expression (such as class or gender discrimination, 
provision of public health services) will be conceptually 
contested in any forum that crosses discursive and cultural 
boundaries [65-69]. Those who defend any form of genital 
mutilation, for example, may appeal to protection of health 
(survival), the stability and security of cultural tradition 
and the flourishing that accompanies initiation into a 
culture. Those who oppose it point to inherent risks, 
potential damage to psychological health and sexual 
pleasure. Both sides appeal to the same foundational 
values, but their claims are ‘essentially contested’. 
 In Western liberal countries, we adhere to notions of 
personal freedom, autonomy, the realisation of capabilities 
and so on and we use such criteria as norms against which 
to measure the choices and behaviours of other cultures 
and societies. Those others judge our choices and 
behaviours in the same way. We may agree that all seek 
the same ends, but the ways in which we enact the pursuit 
of these ends are filtered by cultural intuitions and 
differences. There may be wide cross-cultural agreement 
that certain crimes should be punished, for example, but 
radical disagreement about the death penalty or punitive 
amputation. All parties to the argument will point to their 
own approach as a logical and morally appropriate way to 
protect the security of their people. It is the reasoning and 
the belief systems behind the local practices that cause 
essential contestability, not the foundational values that 
provide the ultimate justifications for undertaking the 
construction of social systems. 
There is similarity between our reasoning and that of 
Martha Nussbaum in her work on virtues. She has 
identified non-relative virtues that respond to ‘grounding 
experiences’ and has confronted problems with relativism 
[70]. She argues for common features of humanity, 
common needs, values and experiences from which to 
construct a common discourse. She lists mortality, 
embodiment, pleasure and pain, cognitive capability, 
practical reason, early infant development, affiliation and 
humour as categories for debate. She comments that from 
these categories ‘We do not have a bedrock of completely 
uninterpreted “given” data, but we do have nuclei of 
experience around which the constructions of different 
societies proceed’ [70]. We suggest that Nussbaum’s 
categories can be subsumed within our own; that ‘survival’ 
includes mortality and early infant development at least; 
that ‘security’ includes pain, practical reason, early infant 
development and affiliation and that ‘flourishing’ includes 
embodiment, pleasure, cognitive capability, affiliation and 
humour. Our categories also cover shelter, welfare, justice, 
transport and other public services like health. 
In dealing with the issue of all-embracing relativism, 
her approach, like ours, does not endorse an ‘anything-
goes’ approach to the practices that express foundational 
values. She writes: 
 
But the relativist has, so far, shown no reason why 
we could not at the end of the day, say that certain 
ways of conceptualizing death are more in keeping 
with the totality of our evidence and the totality of 
our wishes for flourishing life than others; that 
certain ways of experiencing appetitive desire are for 
similar reasons more promising than others.(p.261). 
 
Nussbaum’s reference to ‘the totality of our wishes’ 
raises the issue of globalisation. Abuses of human rights 
are drawn into global discourses. Critiques of honour 
killings, genital mutilation, detention without trial, the 
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health consequences of poverty, and so on, are now issues 
for the media and its participants. They become harder and 
harder for politicians and public intellectuals to set aside. 
Changes may be painfully slow – indeed they may never 
come – but the forces for change have new ways to move 
and new institutions to back them up. Groups like Amnesty 
International (www.amnesty.org/) and Transparency 
International (www.transparency.org/) now contribute 
increasingly to international discourse on human rights. 
Television, radio, computers, newspapers and mobile 
telephones are disseminative technologies of extraordinary 
power. Their roles in the recent riots in Britain and the 
Arab uprisings reinforce what Nussbaum wrote in 1988 
[71]: 
 
…it is necessary to stress that hardly any cultural 
group today is as focussed upon its own internal 
traditions and as isolated from other cultures as the 
relativist argument presupposes. Cross-cultural 
communication and debate are ubiquitous facts of 
contemporary life. 
 
Modest foundationalism does not equate to extreme 
relativism. Nor does it equate to normative ethics. Modest 
foundationalism is descriptive, not prescriptive. The 
understanding that can be derived from viewing cultures as 
expressions of foundational values does not justify 
whatever we find. Rather, it provides a focus for critical 
reflection on our own culture and for discursive and 
dialectical engagements with cultures unlike our own. It 
represents one component of the wide reflective 
equilibrium [72-74] that is necessary for fully formulated 
ethical reasoning about medicine or any other social 
practice. 
 
 
Values-based medicine 
 
So how does this play out in medicine? First, our 
conception provides us with a way of understanding why 
we have health systems at all. We have health systems to 
save life, to preserve or restore function in the face of 
trauma or disease, to provide access to skills for those with 
health needs. In this way, values-based medicine provides 
us with an abductively-derived “base” for medicine that 
other systems, such as evidence-based medicine, simply 
cannot provide. Second, our conception explains why 
particular health systems have evolved in particular ways 
and why health systems might differ in different settings. 
The Texas Heart Center has a quite different philosophy to 
Médecins sans Frontières. One is a business that depends 
on capitalistic theories of enterprise, selling survival, 
security and flourishing at superb level and high price; the 
other a charitable enterprise that tries to deliver survival, 
security and the capability to flourish to some of the most 
vulnerable people in the world, without profit. Both owe 
their continuing existence to individual and cultural values, 
however differently they may be expressed in different 
socio-economic contexts. Their translation into action in 
different ways has produced the societies and cultures we 
know. Other foundations might have produced better ones, 
but that is to enter the domain of speculative ethics, to 
recross the naturalistic barrier into a realm of thought 
experiment.  
This kind of modest foundationalism thus develops 
into a form of values-based medicine (VBM) with broad 
implications, where the word ‘based’ is used deliberately 
to recognise that all healthcare is justified by ‘basic’ 
values. It subsumes EBM, narrative-based medicine, 
patient-centered care, person-centered medicine and public 
health. It respects cultural differences, preferences  and 
ethonomics, the increasingly important intersection 
between ethics and economics [75,76]. By recognising 
their deep, implicit presence we offer practitioners and 
students a direction for the exercise of wide reflective 
equilibrium, the process whereby formative experience, 
moral theory, moral reasoning and moral knowledge are 
brought to bear on an ethical quandary [72-74].  
This leads to the third use of our conception. 
Understanding why particular health systems have evolved 
as they have provides the basis for a critique of these 
systems at all levels, to include their patients, bureaucrats, 
healthcare workers, researchers and so on. Our capacity to 
understand (and empathise) provides us with one 
component of the wide reflective equilibrium according to 
which we can judge our own healthcare practices and those 
of others. We can understand, for example, some of the 
heat engendered by the dispute about the use of Factor VII 
mentioned early in this article, because it arises in the 
tension between individual and communitarian conceptions 
of survival, security and flourishing. Those who practise 
dyadic medicine must deal with the immediate threat of 
blood loss, whose consequences are disability or death for 
their patients, suffering and loss for families. Their sense 
of security and flourishing depend on the survival of the 
patient. Surely all measures that may limit blood loss are 
justified to achieve that end here and now while the 
bleeding is happening? Those who fund health services, or 
make policy or who follow EBM’s central precepts must 
take a different view and focus on measurable outcomes 
such as survival and the risks of complications. In the 
absence of overwhelming evidence of benefit or harm, 
dyadic practitioners appeal to potential to secure survival 
for individual patients and to insure their own sense of 
purpose and hence the security and flourishing that comes 
from being able to say “I did all I could.” From a 
communitarian standpoint, the individual episode is less 
important than the epidemiological outcomes. If there is no 
clear evidence that survival is increased and a utilitarian 
calculus of security and flourishing produces equivocal 
results, then uncertainty must rule out the use of a 
treatment that remains ‘Not Proven’. Both sides may agree 
on the importance of survival, security and flourishing, 
while remaining divided on the significance of a ‘Not 
Proven’ verdict. 
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Conclusion 
 
VBM, thus conceived, places foundational values 
(survival, security and flourishing) at the heart of medical 
education, training and practice. It goes beyond equating 
values with preferences [29,30,32]; it tries to find the 
reasons behind preferences and to stress their 
commonality. It does not seek (on its own) to alter the 
content of healthcare or its curriculum, but to remind us of 
the real justifications for the medical endeavour. VBM will 
not ensure that the WHO model of health (‘Health is a state 
of complete physical, mental and social wellbeing and not 
merely the absence of disease or infirmity’ (see 
https://apps.who.int/aboutwho/en/definition.html) will be 
guaranteed in a society that represses its citizens, robs 
them of their autonomy, dignity or freedom and in which 
those in power are concerned only with their own survival, 
security and flourishing. VBM can help those who work in 
health to keep in mind what justifies the existence of the 
health system in which they work and justifies the 
enormous expense of money, effort and emotion involved. 
It can encourage them to compare their attitudes, practices 
and desirable outcomes with other systems in other 
cultures. VBM asks that its practitioners bear in mind the 
commonality of justification for what they do and look 
beyond the cultural and individual differences that so often 
threaten to divide communities of practice [77-79] from 
one another. 
VBM, couched in these terms, provides no cut-and-
dried answers to the perennial problems of bioethics. What 
it might do, however, is provide a conceptual framework 
and a heuristic for understanding, reflection, discourse and 
dialectic when there appear to be irreconcilable differences 
between practices. VBM incorporates EBM, patient-
centered care, public health, bench-top research and 
person-centered medicine. It has some claims to be the 
basis for medical education at all levels, for establishing 
standards of practice and for reflection on ethical 
quandaries at individual and population levels. In no way 
does it compete with person-centered medicine for 
rhetorical priority, but it may offer a further justification 
for value-laden theorising in medical epistemology and 
practice. Some may even prefer to use the concept in the 
dialectic of revision between the ‘scientistic’ and the 
‘humanistic’ extremes of healthcare theory. 
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